I. Introduction “[I]t has become evident in the years since . . . that [the] burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply. . . . Thus, even if [the burden-shifting framework were] doctrinally sound, the problems associated with its application have eliminated any perceivable benefit from extending its framework to ADEA claims.”[1] With this sweeping language, Justice Thomas punctuated the Supreme Court’s repudiation of mixed-motive burden-shifting for employment discrimination claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)[2] and set age-related employment discrimination claims on a decidedly different track from its counterparts under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).[3] In doing so, the Supreme Court halted the inchoate development toward a uniform approach concerning the burden of persuasion in employment discrimination claims and, for now, instituted the coexistence of two separate analytical frameworks for allocating the burden of persuasion in employment discrimination cases. While ostensibly procedural and esoteric, the degree to which courts will ease the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases has enormous practical significance and is an important reflection of current policy preferences. Because employers often control much of the evidence relevant to adverse employment actions, employees face significant obstacles in [read more]